

# **THE UNITED STATES AND GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER- TERRORISM**

**DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY**

**OCTOBER 2011**

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# Overview

- **Taking Stock: Gender, Development & CVE to Date**
  - *CHRGJ, A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism (2011)*
- **Moving Forward: Putting Gender in USAID Policy**
  - **USAID, The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy, Putting Principles into Practice (2011)**
- **Lessons for NAP UNSCR 1325**

# Methodology

- Regional Stakeholder Workshops Fall 2010: United States, Africa, Asia, MENA
- USG Interviews:
  - Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice
  - U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): Africa Bureau; Asia Bureau (various offices); Middle East Bureau; Office of Transition Initiatives; Office of Women in Development (now Office of Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment); USAID in Bangkok, Thailand and Nairobi, Kenya.
- U.K. (HMG) Prevent strategy
  - E.g. Home Office, Department for International Development (DfID), Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
- Additional expert consultation and interviews
  - USG implementing partners e.g. AIR, AED, MSI, CHF, EDC
  - Inter-governmental e.g. U.N. World Food Programme, Somalia and NATO
  - NGOs, academics

# Examples of Development Assistance for CVE

## USAID

- ❑ Peace for Development (PDEV) in Niger and Chad: improving local governance, empowering at-risk youth, and rendering violent ideologies redundant (TSCTP)
- ❑ Mali e.g. Shared Governance through Decentralization, Trickle Up/microenterprise)(TSCTP)
- ❑ G-Youth, Garissa, Kenya; Shaqodoon: Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (EARSII)
- ❑ Pakistan Civilian Assistance Program e.g. FATA Livelihood Development Program (\$300 million, 5 years)
- ❑ U.S. Yemen strategy e.g. the Community Livelihoods Project (“mitigate the drivers of instability”); Responsive Governance Program

## Examples cont'd

### Military

- ❑ U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines since 2002, humanitarian development in Mindanao, 80% civ-mil. operations
- ❑ AFRICOM Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) (“indirect approach to counter violent extremism,” 60% civil-affairs projects e.g. northeast and coastal areas of Kenya)
- ❑ Yemen, U.S. military (e.g. CJTF-HOA) development assistance e.g. health, education
- ❑ PRTs (Iraq, Afghanistan)

# Gender, Development and CVE: Shifting Landscapes

## **What: Gender siloing**

- ❑ USAID gender analysis & evaluation (e.g. gender-sensitive indicators, sex disaggregated data) not applied

## **Why/How: 4 key shifts**

- ❑ Source of funds
- ❑ Basis on which project beneficiaries are identified
- ❑ Modalities for the design and implementation of programs
- ❑ Monitoring and evaluation tools

## **And/so?**

- ❑ Frustrates both gender equality/HR and specific CVE objectives and...
- ❑ Development response to VE and insurgency undercut equality-national security nexus e.g. NSS 2010

# Gender and CVE Project Funding

- ❑ **Section 1207 Funding (now Complex Crises Fund) (e.g. TSCTP, G-Youth, Shaqodoon)**
- ❑ **E.g. G-Youth/EDC assessment & project-design document:**
  - ❑ Activities: “when an extremism component is a key part of the assessment, other technical sectors are bound to receive less coverage. Accordingly, the assessment prioritized the 1207 directive and took into account some of the more pressing sectoral trends.”
  - ❑ Beneficiaries: the G-Youth Career Resource Center, “will be open to both male and female youth...a special effort will be made to engage male youth in Center activities given the 1207 funding criteria for this project.”

# Gender and CVE Project Beneficiaries

- Target “at-risk” male youth EVEN where girls’ needs = or >
  - i.e. Risk over need e.g. G-Youth, 65% male, 35% female
- Women as beneficiaries dependent on implementing partner BUT still challenges e.g. livelihood programs in male-dominated industries, training schedules
- Limited/secondary focus on women e.g. reducing vulnerability to extremism (war widows in Iraq), investments in women in Pakistan, women as mothers (Kenya)

# Gender and CVE Project Design, Stakeholders, Implementation

## □ Gender & CVE analytic framework

- Gender in cultural drivers/profile of “at risk” population: *Drivers Guide (2009)*
- Adjust (e.g. frame within local religion) and avoid gender programs to generate less hostility: *Programming Guide (2009)*

## □ Stakeholders & outreach

- May be limited scope for outreach e.g. risk assessment, when focus is on resilience.

# Gender and CVE Project Design, Stakeholders, Implementation

## **BUT in practice...**

- Significant barriers to women's participation: e.g. Pakistan
  - ATF rules limit ability to fund women's organizations
  - Expansive community outreach not permitted
  - Gender neutral outcome indicators
  - Sensitivity on programming on women's rights in communities under threat
  - Absence of gender safeguards for planned shifts toward local organizations e.g. few women-owned construction groups, lack of gender sensitivity in local organizations
  - Targeting of individuals who work with West
- Opportunities increase when CVE is w/in conflict mitigation e.g. Peace II

# Gender in Military Development Activities: General

- ❑ Fails to consult with all stakeholders (including USAID)
- ❑ Prioritizes projects with quick impact over long-term gains
- ❑ Not familiar with gender concerns
- ❑ Lacks transparency and accountability in fund disbursement
- ❑ No staff longevity to understand local gender dynamics and gain trust
- ❑ Undermines work and reputation of other USG agencies
- ❑ Inherently more concerned with security vs. humanitarianism

# Gender, Monitoring and Evaluation of CVE Programs

- Need to measure gender & CVE
  - Effective CT protects whole populations—incl. women—from terrorism
  - Gender inputs: gender & risk
  - Gender impacts: e.g. negative (e.g. increased discrimination against women), positive (e.g. drops in DV?)
- Challenges in measuring CVE effectiveness
  - No baseline data for measuring progress e.g. upper FATA (USAID IG)
  - Absence of/confusion re. core goals e.g. reduce the general enabling environment for terrorism or tackle recruitment more directly?
  - Measurement of inputs, outputs NOT outcomes e.g. TSCTP
  - Most useful data unavailable/expensive e.g. survey data

# Gender, Monitoring and Evaluation of CVE Programs

- Challenges in measuring gender in CVE: “it’s difficult to measure CVE, let alone CVE and gender.” (USAID Official)
  - Attitudinal i.e. CVE concerns male youth
  - Absence of gender-specific indicators/gender neutral target outcomes
  - Failure to require reporting on basis of sex-disaggregated data

# Moving Forward: Putting Gender in USAID Policy

## **USAID, The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy, Putting Principles into Practice (2011)**

- Outlining key concepts, drivers, and development responses;
- Elaborating specific engagement criteria and programming principles; and
- Identifying institutional enhancements to support USAID's development role.

# Sound and Effective Development

- “It [the strategy] affirms that effective development responses to these phenomena [violent extremism and insurgency] target specific factors in specific settings based on sound development principles and in a manner consistent with the USG’s broader promotion of universal values, including democracy and human rights.”
- “USAID will develop new guidance to facilitate program analysis, design, and implementation, in accordance with this policy.”

# Consultation and Partner Vetting

- “In program assessment, design, implementation and evaluation, USAID will engage a wide range of country stakeholders – from the community to the national level – who are committed to addressing the development related drivers of violent extremism and insurgency.”
- “Local, customary authorities are key partners. Given the instability in insurgency environments in particular, working with existing local authorities that play governance roles (e.g. dispute resolution and security) is important.”
- “The Agency will engage nontraditional partners in countering local drivers of violent extremism and insurgency. Diaspora groups, the private sector, and local religious leaders often possess a reach that make them potentially effective partners in amplifying USAID’s local impact.”

# Knowledge Base: Understanding VE and Insurgency

- Gender and “Push factors”:
  - *“Poorly governed or ungoverned areas* may enable violent extremists to establish sanctuaries or safe havens. Poorly governed areas may create passive or active support for such groups by communities who feel marginalized or neglected by a lack of government reach. First, a lack of services can create opportunities for service provision by extremist groups. Second, a lack of security or rule of law can allow violent extremists to operate and possibly impose their own order, and may propel individuals to join armed groups as the perceived strongest actor.”
  - *“Government repression and human rights violations.* Cruel, degrading treatment by police or security forces, or being closely connected to someone who suffered at their hands, for example, can be significant risk factors. They can lead to a desire for revenge. The harsher and more widespread the repression (especially if concentrated in common locales such as prisons), the greater the push to embrace violent extremism.”

## Knowledge Base cont'd

- “*Cultural threat perceptions*. This includes the often deeply held, existential perception of domination by another group, the West, or an oppressive international order. Cultural drivers also include more broadly perceived threats to related customs and values, including gender roles and education”

## Knowledge Base cont'd

- Gender and “Pull” Factors
  - “Gaps remain in USAID’s understanding of violent extremism and insurgency. This includes the role of gender. Women may act as both a potential brake on, as well as a driver of, violent extremism. Some suggest that family ties, and women’s roles in families, create psychological barriers for husbands, sons, or other male relatives to join violent extremist groups. Others have asserted that women may serve as motivators for male family members to join. Understanding the role of gender at the local level is fundamental.”

# Knowledge Base: Responding to Violent Extremism and Insurgency

- *“Cultural drivers should not be ignored. While less amenable to influence by development assistance, there are principles that should be considered to address cultural drivers, for example, by respecting indigenous and/or religious customs. These might be addressed, in part, by engaging indigenous religious leaders or other groups and supporting alternative voices. (Missions should consult with USAID’s Regional Legal Advisor (RLA) or General Counsel (GC) in advance of programming to ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment concerning separation of church and state.)”*

# USAID's Distinct and Critical Role

- *“Development and technical expertise. USAID has development expertise in areas such as democratic governance, health, education, economic growth, agriculture, and other sectors....”*

# Policy Guidance: Engagement Criteria

- “These criteria include:
  - an assessment of the drivers of violent extremism and insurgency, host country (government and population) commitment, and potential development responses;
  - a determination of an appropriate and critical role for development assistance;
  - a determination that an adequate level of security exists to permit implementing partners to operate and communicate with USAID;
  - identification of risks to the Agency, our partners and related development investments, as well as a plan to mitigate risk; and,
  - consideration of program, resource, and management plans required for implementation.”

## For Analysis, Planning and Design

- “Informed by local research and assessment, USAID Missions will identify and prioritize drivers, set clear objectives, design a focused set of interventions, and systematically evaluate related measures of progress and impact. In their assessments, Missions should consider the role of women vis-a-vis drivers and any relevant development responses.”
- “In program assessment, design, implementation and evaluation, USAID will engage a wide range of country stakeholders – from the community to the national level – who are committed to addressing the development related drivers of violent extremism and insurgency.”

# For Operational and Management Responsiveness

- “Independent, third-party monitoring and local stakeholder feedback, where appropriate, can also be useful.”
- “Where relevant, USAID will track outcome level indicators in the geographic areas that its programs are targeting to monitor whether its activities are helping to reduce the emergence and severity of violent extremism and insurgency.”
- “Another important element of management and oversight is consistent, appropriate collection of, and reporting on, measures of progress and impact related to countering drivers of violent extremism and insurgency.”
- “In kind rather than cash assistance to local organizations allows the Agency to work with nontraditional partners who either are not formal organizations or would not necessarily meet requirements for receiving cash grants. In kind assistance provides the Agency a modality through which to take a risk by supporting actors who are new to receiving assistance, but have important ideas that need to be supported.”

# USAID Internal Changes

- “Establish and empower an Agency Steering Committee”
- “USAID will develop new guidance to facilitate program analysis, design, and implementation, in accordance with this policy.”
- “USAID will coordinate an applied research agenda, and disseminate findings, as appropriate. Possible research areas include: gender in countering violent extremism and insurgency; use of media and communications; and, program measurement and evaluation.”